Introduction
Reverse domain name notation writing identifiers like com.example.app instead of app.example.com has become a de facto standard for naming software packages and applications. This convention is pervasive across programming ecosystems and platforms, from Java class packages to Android app IDs and iOS bundle identifiers. It was adopted to ensure global uniqueness and avoid naming collisions without requiring a central authority. However, reverse-DNS naming was never backed by formal regulation or ownership verification. In practice, any developer can choose any reverse domain string for their software, regardless of whether they own that Internet domain. This gap between implied and actual ownership creates security and trust challenges that attackers can exploit.
Threat model:
Adversaries can abuse the assumed trust in domain-based names by impersonating brands or organizations in their identifiers. For example, a malicious Android app could declare a package name like com.somebank.secure to appear affiliated with a trusted bank, or an iOS app could use a bundle ID resembling a well-known company. Such choices exploit user and system assumptions a human or a password manager might trust an app that “looks” like it comes from somebank.com. Meanwhile, defenders (platform providers, app stores, security tools, and users) lack a built-in mechanism to verify that an app claiming the prefix com.somebank is actually authorized by the owner of somebank.com. The core issue is that reverse-DNS naming, despite looking like an identity signal, provides no cryptographic or administrative guarantee of authenticity. In this research memo, we critically examine the emergence of reverse domain naming, its current use, where its governance falls short, and how that gap can be exploited. We then explore why stronger controls were not historically implemented, and propose what a more regulated or verified naming scheme might entail. Finally, we outline recommendations for platform vendors, registrars, app stores, and enterprises to improve trust in software identifiers without breaking existing ecosystems. The goal is to make arguments explicit and evidence-based, avoiding vague claims and acknowledging limitations, in order to chart a realistic path forward.
Reverse Domain Name Notation: Purpose and Origins
What is reverse-DNS naming?
Reverse domain name notation is a naming convention in which a name is structured by reversing an Internet domain and using it as a prefix (for example, a company owning example.com would use names starting with com.example). This scheme was first popularized in computing by the Java programming language in the mid-1990s. Java’s designers needed a way to guarantee that package names created by different developers would not conflict. Their solution was to piggyback on the existing global DNS hierarchy (which ensures that domain names are globally unique to one owner). By using one’s registered domain name in reverse as a package namespace, developers could generate unique package identifiers without a new centralized registry. As the Java Language Specification (1996) explains, “you form a unique package name by first having (or belonging to an organization that has) an Internet domain name… then reverse this name… and use this as a prefix for your package names. This convention is explicitly described as a standard but not enforced rule: “This section specifies a standard convention, not enforced by a Java compiler, for generating such unique package names… The Java convention… is merely a way to piggyback a package naming convention on top of an existing, widely known unique name registry instead of having to create a separate registry for Java package names”. In short, reverse-DNS naming was a clever engineering shortcut to achieve uniqueness: it leveraged the fact that domain names were (in the mid-90s) a well-known, globally unique resource, thus avoiding the need to invent a new global naming authority for software components.
Problems it was intended to solve:
The primary goal was to ensure namespace uniqueness and prevent collisions. By incorporating an organization’s Internet domain, the chance of two unrelated parties picking the same name approaches zero (since no two entities should own the same domain). This solved a real problem in software distribution: without unique naming, integrating libraries or apps from different sources could lead to conflicts or ambiguity. Reverse-DNS naming also provides a logical organization of names by organization or project. For example, all packages or classes from Example Corp might start with com.example. grouping them together hierarchically. In the context of software distribution, a secondary (often touted) benefit is discoverability and implied trust: if you encounter a library named com.adobe.photoshop.plugin, it suggests it is related to Adobe, which can help developers or users identify the source or maintaine. Indeed, one advantage cited by practitioners is that a reverse-DNS package name “makes it easier to find the maintainer if you inherit a codebase that uses some open source library, it better be in a package that helps you find it”. In theory, knowing the domain can hint at the publisher (e.g. org.apache.* signals an Apache Software Foundation project). Thus, reverse-DNS names can act as a weak form of namespacing and trust signaling in the absence of a formal identity system. Importantly, however, any trust signal is incidental the scheme was not designed to guarantee authenticity, only uniqueness. The Java spec itself cautioned that the package name does “not imply anything about where the package is stored” on the Internet. This means using com.example in a name doesn’t ensure the code actually came from example.com; it’s simply likely if developers follow the convention in good faith.
Historical precedent:
An interesting historical footnote is that reverse ordering of names predates Java the UK academic network JANET in the 1980s used reversed naming for hostnames (e.g. uk.ac.university instead of the Internet standard university.ac.uk). This was a different context (network addresses rather than software IDs) and eventually was replaced by standard DNS naming. But it showed the idea of reversing a hierarchy to sort by broad category first (like country or top-level domain) has been explored before. Java’s adoption of reverse-DNS for packages was the watershed moment that brought this concept into mainstream software development. Once Sun Microsystems established it in Java conventions, it influenced many other systems.
Summary:
Reverse domain notation was intended to solve the namespace collision problem in a straightforward way by leveraging an existing unique identifier (the domain name) that most companies or projects already possessed. It provided a scalable means to generate distinct identifiers (classes, packages, app IDs) without coordination. The design consciously avoided building new governance “instead of having to create a separate registry,” developers would just reuse DNS. This laissez-faire approach worked remarkably well for uniqueness and was widely adopted. But, as we will examine, it left a governance vacuum: no one ensured that the name’s implication of ownership or origin was true. Uniqueness was largely achieved (collisions are rare), yet authenticity and authority remained unverified.
Ubiquity of Reverse-DNS Naming in Modern Ecosystems
Over the past two decades, reverse domain identifiers have become the default convention across multiple software domains. What began with Java packages now spans mobile apps, libraries, and configuration identifiers. Here we survey where this scheme is used today and why each context chose it:
Java Packages and Modules:
As discussed, Java uses reverse-DNS for package names (e.g. java.util.logging or com.fasterxml.jackson.core). Every public Java library typically has a base package corresponding to a domain owned by the author or organization (or at least one that sounds unique). The convention is so entrenched that tools and linters flag packages not following it. Even new Java features like the module system (JPMS) continue the practice for module naming. The key reason: collision avoidance and grouping. In large codebases or when pulling many dependencies, the reverse-DNS structure prevents classpath conflicts. It became a “non-negotiable standard in the industry” for Java developers to use their domain name as a prefix. Notably, nothing in the Java compiler or runtime enforces domain ownership it’s purely by conventiont. But community norms are strong; a package like com.google.gson clearly indicates Google’s JSON library, and using that name if you aren’t Google would be seen as ill-advised (though not technically impossible).
Android Application IDs (Package Names):
Android, being built on Java, inherited the reverse-DNS naming style for app identifiers. Every Android app has an applicationId which “looks like a Java package name, such as com.example.myapp” and must be unique on a device and in the Google Play Store. Google’s documentation explicitly notes that while the ID resembles a domain-based package name, it is simply a unique identifier with specific rules (at least two segments, alphanumeric only, etc.). In fact, the Android SDK guide emphasizes “this name has nothing to do with DNS names. It looks a little like a DNS name, but they have no significant relationship”. The reason reverse-DNS became the default for Android apps is again uniqueness and convention if every developer uses their domain (or a domain-like string) in the app ID, collisions are avoided by default. Google recommends (but does not require) that the app ID match the app’s code package namespace for simplicity. Importantly, Google does not verify that com.example.myapp actually belongs to “example.com” in a web sense; it is simply treated as a string. The only enforcement is that no two apps on Google Play can have the same identifier, and once you publish an app, you cannot change its ID without effectively creating a new app. This ensures uniqueness within the Play ecosystem, but not beyond it. Other app markets or APK distribution outside Play could use the same ID with no global coordination. The reverse-DNS form was chosen because it was already familiar to Java developers and provides a low-friction way to generate a unique name. As one Android developer summarized: “It just has to be unique if you are publishing to the Play Store, that's why the reverse domain com.google... style is popular it’s highly unlikely two developers pick the same domain prefix by accident”.
iOS Bundle Identifiers:
Apple similarly uses reverse domain notation for iOS and macOS app bundle IDs. For example, Apple’s Pages app is com.apple.Pages. Third-party iOS apps typically follow com.yourcompany.yourapp format. Apple’s developer documentation states that the bundle identifier “is a unique identifier for a bundle in reverse-DNS format”. Apple encourages using your organization’s Internet domain to ensure the bundle ID is unique across the entire ecosystem. In Apple’s provisioning system, the bundle ID (combined with a developer/team ID) forms an App ID used for code signing and distribution. Apple requires bundle IDs to be unique across the App Store no two different apps can share the same identifier. This global uniqueness requirement makes the reverse-DNS scheme useful: developers just prepend a domain or unique string to their app name. However, like Android, Apple does not require proof that you own the domain in your bundle ID. It’s a convention “to avoid conflicts”, not a verified property. As a result, you could name your app com.microsoft.Word even if you have no affiliation to Microsoft the system will technically allow it so long as no other published app uses that exact ID. (Apple might reject it during App Review for trademark reasons if it’s obviously misleading, but that is a policy choice, not a platform rule.) On enterprise-distributed apps (outside the App Store), there is no review any bundle ID is accepted by devices as long as it doesn’t conflict with an already installed app. The reverse-DNS naming became default on iOS likely because Apple inherited many NeXT/macOS conventions and because it was a straightforward way to generate unique IDs. Apple’s tooling (Xcode) even auto-suggests a reverse domain based on your “Organization Identifier”, a field where developers typically input a domain name they own or project name.
Maven Coordinates and Other Package Managers:
In the world of build and dependency management, Maven (for Java) popularized using reverse domains for group identifiers. A Maven groupId identifies the project or organization publishing an artifact, and official Maven guidelines state: “Each groupId should follow Java’s package name rules. This means it starts with a reversed domain name you control.”. For example, all Apache Software Foundation projects use org.apache.* groupIds (e.g. org.apache.commons), Google libraries use com.google.*. This convention greatly reduces the risk of dependency name clashes in repositories like Maven Central. It also has an implied trust aspect: if you see a library’s groupId is com.fasterxml.jackson, you expect it’s published by the owner of fasterxml.com (or the Jackson project associated with that domain). Maven Central in fact discourages generic or one-word groupIds; it is difficult to get a new top-level name approved unless it’s clearly unique to your project. However, even Maven Central does not have an absolute verification of domain ownership it relies on community policing and the repository’s administrators to notice if someone illegitimately uses an obvious trademark or domain. Other ecosystems have analogous patterns: Python packages often use namespace packages like azure.storage.* for Microsoft Azure libraries, and while Python doesn’t enforce reverse DNS, the idea of namespacing packages by organization has caught on informally. In modern module repositories (npm, etc.), namespacing is handled differently (scoped packages), but for compiled languages and system configurations, reverse-DNS remains common. Even Freedesktop specifications and Linux desktop files use reverse domains for things like D-Bus service names or application IDs (e.g. org.freedesktop.Notifications), again for uniqueness across projects.
Why it became the default:
In all these cases, the reverse domain scheme caught on because it was simple, memorable, and worked without new infrastructure. Organizations already had domain names; reusing them was easier than registering a new identifier with some central authority. The scheme scales naturally (anyone in the world can create a unique name by using a domain they have rights to, or at least a domain no one else is using in that context). It’s also self-documenting to some extent: the name itself carries a hint of origin. Finally, early adopters like Java, Apple, and Android set an example that others followed it became part of “best practices” and was taught to new developers. Importantly, no global oversight was introduced alongside this spread. Each platform or ecosystem enforced uniqueness within its own scope (e.g., no two iOS apps with the same bundle ID on the App Store, no duplicate Maven coordinates in Central, etc.), but none verified that the DNS portion corresponded to a legal or organizational right. In essence, reverse-DNS naming became a convention rather than a regulated standard, due to its convenience and the lack of immediate problems it presented in the early years.
The Governance Gap: Ownership Implication vs. Reality
At first glance, an identifier like com.somebrand.app suggests a relationship to somebrand.com. In practice, this is often true (developers use their own domain), but crucially, there is no technical guarantee of that relationship. This is the core governance gap in reverse-DNS naming: it appears to denote ownership or origin, but that implication is not enforced by any authority.
Several factors contribute to this gap:
No Central Authority or Registry:
Reverse domain names were explicitly introduced to avoid creating a new registry. Unlike domain names themselves, which you must register with ICANN-accredited registrars, there is no equivalent body issuing or approving software identifiers. The system relies on the honor principle that you will use your own domain name. If someone chooses a domain prefix that they don’t own, there’s no built-in mechanism (no “whois” lookup or registry check) that would flag this. The Java compiler, Android system, iOS provisioning, etc., do not perform DNS checks on the strings. They treat com.somebrand.app as an opaque token.
Domain Ownership Can Change:
Even if a package or app name was originally based on a legitimately held domain, domains are transferable assets. Companies get acquired or rebrand, individuals might lose their domain registration after expiration, etc. The reverse-DNS names, however, tend to live on in code and binaries. There is no lifecycle linkage that updates package names when a domain changes hands. A striking example was given in a discussion of this topic: “Java's style doesn't guarantee [permanent uniqueness], since domain name ownership can switch hands. A developer who owns jUtils.com can develop a com.jutils.* library that many use, and then sell his domain to a completely different developer who develops a different com.jutils.* library… causing collisions.”. In that scenario, the domain’s new owner has effectively inherited the namespace (at least nominally), but the original com.jutils library still exists in the wild, now with an arguably misleading identity. There is no process to reconcile that or alert users. The assumption of constancy (that domains are stable) is not always valid, yet the naming scheme has no provision to deal with domain transfers.
No Requirement to Ever Own the Domain:
A developer can adopt a reverse-DNS style identifier that corresponds to no real domain or to someone else’s domain which they have never owned. For example, nothing technically stops me from publishing a Java library under org.apache.myutils (even if I have no connection to Apache) or releasing an app with bundle ID com.google.photos (even if I’m not Google). If the name isn’t already taken in the distribution channel, it will work. In fact, this happens not infrequently for unused domains or dummy names like com.example or com.test. One iOS developer noted: “You do not have to use your real domain name. In fact, you can use mine, and I can use yours, and it won't make a difference because domain usage/ownership is neither checked nor enforced.”. Apple’s and Google’s systems only care that the string is unique; they do not validate it against Internet DNS records. This non-requirement means the semantic link to an actual domain owner is often broken by design. Many open-source developers without a personal domain simply make one up (e.g., using com.github.username.project or a fictitious domain). As long as it’s unique, it’s accepted.
Illusion of Trust/Legitimacy:
Because well-behaved developers usually follow the convention (using their own domain or a plausible unique string), over time there is an informal trust signal associated with reverse-DNS names. For instance, if you see an Android app’s ID is com.adobe.scan.mobile, you might assume “this is Adobe’s app” (and indeed Adobe’s official app uses that). But a rogue developer could conceivably publish an app com.adobe.scan.pro and try to trick users. The average user typically doesn’t see the internal package name, but power users, enterprise admins, or tools might. Moreover, some security tools and OS features historically made inferences based on package name. Before Android introduced explicit domain verification for app links, some password managers and link handlers would guess the association between a website and an app by matching domain names in the app’s package name. This led to real security vulnerabilities: researchers found that certain mobile password managers would auto-fill credentials into a malicious app if its package name started with the target website’s domain in reverse. “For example, we created an app with package name com.facebook.evil and we were able to upload it to the Play Store without problems: when the user opens this app, LastPass automatically suggests credentials related to facebook.com.”. This happened because LastPass was looking at the app’s name and seeing “com.facebook…” and assuming it’s the Facebook app. Here, the implication of ownership (Facebook) was false, and it directly undermined trust. The governance gap allowed an attacker to signal a trusted identity without actually being that identity.
Platform Governance is Partial:
The only governance that does exist is at the platform or store level, focusing on uniqueness and sometimes trademarks. Google Play and Apple App Store will ensure no two apps use the same package/bundle ID (to prevent technical conflicts). They also have policies against impersonation, so if you blatantly name your app after a famous brand you have no rights to, it might get flagged by review or a trademark complaint. However, these measures are not consistent or guaranteed to catch all abuse. They rely on manual review and legal trademarks, not an automatic linkage of domain ownership. Critically, they are siloed Google might stop two apps in its store from conflicting, but it won’t stop an Android malware author outside the Play Store from using whatever package name they want. Apple’s review might reject an obvious com.apple.safari fake app, but Apple has no visibility into internal enterprise apps using misleading IDs. There is no universal authority that says “you can’t call your software X because that domain is owned by Y.” Only the domain name system itself has that kind of authority, and it is not connected to software naming.
In summary, reverse-DNS names create an illusion of a verified identity when none exists. The scheme relies on each developer’s diligence and good intent. When those fail either through malice or simply through organizational changes the naming convention has no built-in corrective measures. Unlike actual domain names (where misuse can be addressed via trademark domain disputes or authentication via SSL certificates), reverse-DNS software identifiers exist in a gray area: they reference the DNS namespace but are not governed by it. This gap means that trusting an identifier at face value is risky. A key design choice of the original system was to not imbue the names with real authority linkage (to keep things simple). The consequence is a structural lack of accountability or verification in the assignment of these names.
Abuse Cases in the Wild: Impersonation and Confusion
The lack of enforcement or validation in reverse domain naming is not just a theoretical concern it has led to practical abuse scenarios. Attackers have leveraged the freedom to choose any package/bundle identifier to impersonate reputable entities or otherwise confuse users and systems. We present two realistic examples, one from Android and one from iOS, illustrating how this can be exploited and why existing controls fall short.
Example 1: Android app “com.somebrand.securebank” (without owning somebrand.com)
Consider a malicious Android application developer who wants to trick users of a particular bank. The legitimate bank (SomeBrand Bank) offers a mobile app, but perhaps only on iOS or only in certain regions, or users might not be familiar with its exact name. An attacker builds a fake banking app and gives it the application ID com.somebrand.securebank, mimicking the bank’s naming. The attacker has zero affiliation with somebrand.com; they simply chose the name because it looks credible. If the attacker distributes this APK outside the official Play Store (for instance, via phishing links or a third-party app store), nothing on the Android device will stop the installation based on the name alone. The device sees a unique package name and will install it (assuming the user consents to sideload). Even on the Google Play Store, if SomeBrand Bank hasn’t published an Android app at all, the name com.somebrand.securebank might be available for the attacker to use. Google Play’s automated systems do not check domain ownership, so the app could initially pass submission. In fact, security researchers have demonstrated how easy it is to slip such impersonators past defenses: as noted earlier, a team successfully uploaded a test app with package name com.facebook.evil to the Play Store Google did not block it because the string met all technical requirements and wasn’t an exact duplicate of an existing app. This malicious app, once installed, can prey on user trust. A savvy user might look at the app details and see the package name containing “somebrand”, giving them false confidence it’s legit. Or the app might exploit Android’s intent filters or link handling to intercept connections (imagine the bank’s website tries to hand off to “com.somebrand.mobileapp” the fake app could claim that intent). Furthermore, other apps on the device might trust it. We saw how password managers can be fooled; similarly, an enterprise MDM (mobile device management) system that allows all apps with package name prefix com.somebrand.* could be deceived if it doesn’t cross-check signatures. Academic analysis confirms that “attackers release apps with identifiers that are confusingly similar to those belonging to popular apps or large Internet brands”. This practice, termed package name squatting, is relatively common in underground Android app distribution. For instance, a study found fake apps targeting Facebook had package names like com.facebook.katana (very close to the actual com.facebook.katana used by the official app) and com.facebook.litf. Those differences are subtle and not visible to users, but they indicate attackers copying the naming scheme to piggyback on trust. In the banking sector, malware often uses names resembling real financial apps. A Zscaler report on an Android banking trojan noted it “disguised itself as an online banking app for Russia's largest bank, Sberbank. The malicious app's appearance was similar to that of the original...”, though the report focuses on UI. It’s likely the package name also mimicked the real one. The bottom line is that on Android, the reverse-DNS identifier can be freely chosen and has been used by attackers to lend fraudulent apps an air of legitimacy. Google has introduced Play Protect and better vetting over time, but as of the current state, there is no rule like “you must prove you own that domain to use it in your app ID.” The trust that a name like com.somebrand.* might evoke is not backed by any guarantee an attacker can and will exploit that disconnect.
Mitigations in place: Google’s primary defense is to rely on developer reputation and user reporting. If an app clearly misuses a brand name, the brand can file a complaint or Google might catch it during review. But this is reactive and not comprehensive. Technically, Android 12+ has the concept of App Links where apps can assert a verified link to a domain (via hosting a file on the website), but that only covers web URL handling and does not verify the package name itself against the domain. (It’s possible to verify that somebrand.com allows com.somebrand.securebank to handle its links, but an attacker obviously wouldn’t have access to the real domain to do that, so they simply wouldn’t use the verified links feature. The app would still install and run without it, just not get auto-linked.) Thus, current processes do not create a universal guarantee of domain-based ownership for Android apps. The attack surface remains open: malicious developers impersonating trusted domains in their package names to exploit user trust or other apps’ assumptions.
Example 2: iOS app with a misleading Bundle ID
On Apple’s platform, an app’s CFBundleIdentifier is likewise a string that developers choose, usually in reverse-DNS form. Suppose an attacker targets iPhone users with a fake VPN app, wanting to appear as a known company. They might give their app a bundle ID like com.microsoft.securedata or com.google.vpn.proxy to suggest a connection to those companies. If the attacker distributes this app outside the App Store (via an enterprise provisioning profile or the upcoming ability in some jurisdictions to sideload or use alternative app stores), there is no technical gatekeeper to refuse that identifier. iOS will install the app as long as the code signing is valid (signed by a known enterprise developer certificate, etc.) and the bundle ID is unique on the device. Apple’s operating system does not ping microsoft.com to ask “should this app be allowed to use your name?”. The App Store, in its review guidelines, does forbid developers from misleadingly using trademarked names or pretending to be another company. But this is a policy enforcement matter, not a fundamental check. Apple does not, for instance, require you to place a TXT record in your domain’s DNS to prove you own example.com before using com.example.app as your bundle ID. During app submission, Apple’s portal will simply check if com.example.app is available (not already used by another app) and allow you to register it for your app if so. In practice, if you try to use com.apple.* or a well-known company’s exact name, Apple might flag it (especially if the company is part of Apple’s Developer Program with trademarks). But there have been cases of apps slipping through with names that sound official. One historical example: many knock-off apps used the prefix com.instagram.xxx or com.netflix.xxx on unofficial app stores or TestFlight links, hoping that when users later see an error log or some detail, the presence of “instagram” in the identifier lends credibility. Unlike Android, iOS doesn’t expose the bundle ID to end-users prominently, so this trick is more for bypassing filters or fooling enterprise admins. An MDM solution, for instance, might allow certain bundle IDs as trusted apps for VPN or security. If an attacker picks a bundle ID that that MDM’s policy views as benign or whitelisted, the malicious app might evade restrictions. Apple’s review process does not and cannot ensure domain-based ownership across all distribution channels. They only vet what goes through the official App Store, and even there, they rely on reviewers to notice mismatches (which might be obvious for something like “Microsoft” but less so for a small brand). Moreover, Apple’s vetting doesn’t coordinate with Google’s or any other ecosystem’s so an attacker could deliberately choose a bundle ID similar to an Android app’s ID, or vice versa, to confuse users who switch platforms. There’s no cross-platform validation (e.g., Apple doesn’t check if an Android app exists with that name or if the domain is owned by someone else).
A concrete illustration of Apple’s non-enforcement is the earlier Reddit thread where a developer worried because they released iOS apps using the default template com.example.myapp as the bundle ID. Multiple iOS developers replied that this is not against any rule; the only risk is if another app tries to use the same bundle ID, they can’t coexist. One responder explicitly said Apple doesn’t care if you used someone else’s domain in the ID: “As long as the owners of example.com do not claim that particular bundle id you’re safe. Even if they do, it’s a long process.”. This highlights that the only avenue for recourse if someone dislikes your use of a domain name in an app identifier is likely a legal complaint (trademark or impersonation claim) a slow, external process. Technically, nothing prevents misleading bundle IDs in iOS apps distributed ad-hoc or via enterprise provisioning. Recent changes (like requiring Apple enterprise developers to have a business identity verification) help tie the app to a real company on Apple’s records, but still not to the domain in the bundle ID. For instance, a verified enterprise could be “Evil Corp LLC” but their app’s bundle ID could start with com.microsoft. Apple’s system would not automatically flag that unless Microsoft complains.
Implications:
These examples underscore that the perceived identity in the identifier can be spoofed. Users and organizations can be misled if they take the naming at face value. Attackers exploit the fact that there is no immediate cryptographic or registry-backed link between the domain portion of the ID and the actual domain owner. The only protections currently in place are indirect: app store reviews, trademark law, user vigilance, and in Android’s case, the Play Store’s developer verification processes (which verify the developer’s identity, not the domain). None of these create a reliable, universal mapping between com.somebrand.* and “actually published by SomeBrand”. Thus, domain-style identifiers can be abused as a form of social engineering and technical subterfuge, contributing to supply-chain attacks (fooling software that interacts with apps by name) and phishing/malware campaigns (fooling users about an app’s legitimacy). The next section discusses why this state of affairs has persisted and why stronger guarantees were not implemented from the start.
Why Haven’t We Fixed This? Incentives and Constraints
Given the clear gap between what reverse domain identifiers imply and what they guarantee, one might ask: why did the industry not establish a verification system or stricter rules for these names? The answers lie in a mix of historical inertia, compatibility challenges, lack of incentive, and the distributed nature of the problem. Several factors have kept the status quo in place:
It “Ain’t Broke” for Uniqueness:
For a long time, the convention was sufficient for its primary purpose (preventing name collisions). There were relatively few incidents where two legitimate parties clashed over the same identifier. The software world implicitly coordinated via domain ownership, and that worked well enough. Without a crisis of rampant collisions, there was little pressure to introduce heavy governance. The mentality was, as one commenter put it, “you are looking at the solution to a different problem… [reverse-DNS] guarantees uniqueness. I don't see why universal uniqueness is a problem that needs solving [beyond that]”. In other words, the designers solved the namespace collision problem and did not consider the lack of authenticity guarantee to be an urgent problem at the time. For many years, this held true most developers played by the rules, and outright name spoofing in mainstream channels was rare.
Back-Compatibility and Ecosystem Lock-In:
By the time security concerns became more apparent, the reverse-DNS scheme was deeply ingrained. There are millions of published packages, apps, and other artifacts that use this naming. Changing the rules would be massively disruptive. For example, if suddenly a central authority said “you can only use a domain in your app/package name if you prove ownership,” that would invalidate countless existing projects (open-source libraries written by individuals who don’t own a domain, student projects using com.example, etc.). The cost of retooling renaming packages, updating imports, changing app IDs (which can break user updates and data continuity) is enormous. Even introducing optional verification is tricky; it creates a two-tier system (verified vs unverified names) which tooling must account for. The inertia of compatibility thus favors maintaining the convention as-is. Java’s spec explicitly noted the convention is not enforced by compilers, and indeed no enforcement was ever added in later Java versions either doing so would break existing code. Similarly, Android’s requirement for app IDs is only that they be unique and follow a syntax; the Play ecosystem can’t retroactively demand domain proof for the millions of apps already on the store.
Developer and Platform Incentives:
For platform owners like Google and Apple, there wasn’t a strong incentive to impose domain verification requirements. Their main interest is ensuring each app is uniquely identifiable within their domain (for app signing, updates, store listing, etc.), which was already achieved. Imposing additional checks (like verifying a domain or coordinating with DNS) could slow down developer onboarding and complicate the app publishing process. From a pure product perspective, requiring every developer to own a domain name (or bother an IT admin to create a DNS record) might deter hobbyists and small developers. Many app developers, especially in the early mobile boom, didn’t have websites or domains. Requiring a domain could have been seen as an unnecessary barrier to entry. Likewise, for Java and other languages a lot of code comes from individuals or research projects with no domain a mandate would push them to use awkward placeholders or register throwaway domains. The community norm settled on “just use something unique, domain-like if possible” rather than strict rules. In short, ease of development and adoption outweighed potential security benefits in the early design decisions.
Fragmentation of Authority:
The issue spans multiple ecosystems (programming languages, operating systems, package repositories). No single standards body or company “owns” the reverse-DNS convention globally. Oracle (formerly Sun) set it for Java, Google for Android, Apple for iOS, Apache for Maven, etc., all independently. Coordinating a universal fix or improvement would require consensus among many stakeholders. Each platform might need to implement its own solution (for example, Google could implement domain verification for Android apps on Play; Apple could for App Store apps; Java could have a tool to reserve package namespaces). But if only one does it and others don’t, attackers and developers will gravitate to the path of least resistance. Historically, such cross-industry coordination is difficult without a catalyzing event.
Lack of Demand and Awareness Until Recently:
The security community only started highlighting software supply chain risks prominently in the last decade. High-profile incidents like package manager typosquatting, dependency confusion (substituting internal packages with public ones), and fraudulent apps have begun to raise awareness that naming schemes can be abused. But earlier, these were niche concerns. When reverse-DNS naming was devised, the threat model did not heavily consider an attacker intentionally picking a deceptive name it was assumed everyone just wanted to avoid collisions, not impersonate. Even as app ecosystems grew, attention was more on malware functionality rather than the nuance of its package name. Only in recent years have reports specifically called out package name squatting and related attacks on mobile. With supply chain security becoming a hot topic (e.g., the 2021 dependency confusion attack, or the SolarWinds incident in 2020 which indirectly highlighted trust issues), demand is now rising for stronger identity guarantees. But historically, that demand was weak. Until there was a clear problem causing harm that justified new friction, neither companies nor developers pushed for change. The attitude was, if something goes wrong due to a misleading name, it’s the attacker’s fault and maybe the store’s review fault not the naming convention’s fault.
Platform-level Mitigations vs Global Standards:
Both Google and Apple have incrementally addressed parts of the problem in platform-specific ways. Google, for example, introduced the Android App Links verification (where app developers can verify a domain to enable direct link handling) and has started verifying developer identities in the Play Store (requiring government ID or business verification). Apple has long required code signing which ties an app to a specific developer identity in Apple’s ecosystem, and more recently requires a developer account to have a verified identity or organization. These measures improve accountability of the developer but not of the domain name used. The stores likely feel that having the real-world identity of the developer (e.g., “John Smith” or “XYZ Corp”) on file and even displayed to users might mitigate some impersonation (if a user checks and sees the developer name does not match the app’s supposed affiliation). Google’s Play Store now actually shows the official website of the developer in many cases, which is a soft form of linking but not tied to the package name. The key point is that stores chose their own verification (of developer) rather than verification of the domain in the name. Introducing domain ownership checks would be a form of global standard possibly involving cooperation with DNS providers, etc. It’s much easier for Google/Apple to verify things within their control (government ID of a developer, etc.) than to set up a whole new system to verify DNS relationships for every app.
Potential for False Sense of Security:
A more subtle reason is that any halfway measure could create complacency or confusion. Suppose a store started “verifying” domains for app IDs but not mandating it universally. You’d end up with some apps having a verified badge and others not. Users might misunderstand what that means. Developers might incorrectly assume a verified domain means an app is safe or official, when it only covers one aspect. The complexity of handling edge cases (domains with multiple apps, apps with no domain, domains changing owners, etc.) could lead to an incomplete solution that doesn’t truly fix the problem but adds complexity. There may have been reluctance to implement something that isn’t bulletproof. In absence of a clear, enforceable standard, platform owners possibly prefer the status quo (with all its warts) over a patchwork fix that might break things or give a false sense of trust.
In essence, the historical lack of action comes down to cost/benefit trade-offs and scope of responsibility. The benefits of introducing strong verification for reverse-DNS IDs (better security, phishing prevention, etc.) were not perceived to outweigh the costs (development effort, developer inconvenience, backward incompatibility) until recently. Each stakeholder might have expected another to take the lead: should ICANN or IANA treat software prefixes as a governed namespace? Should app stores enforce it unilaterally? With no one clearly in charge, and with significant friction involved, the path of least resistance was to stick with the convention as a purely informal trust system.
Only after some notable supply-chain security incidents and increasing academic critique did this become a discussion point. Even now, in 2026, we have not seen a full industry shift but awareness is higher. It often takes high-impact security failures to prompt change. We are starting to see that attention (e.g., the concept of signed package provenance in open-source, or Google encouraging developers to use website association for app links). The next section will outline how a more regulated or verified scheme could work, acknowledging the challenges, and propose steps from minimal to stronger approaches.
What Would a Regulated/Verified Scheme Look Like?
If the industry were to address the shortcomings of reverse domain naming, what options do we have? We can imagine a spectrum from minimal improvements to a full-fledged regulated namespace with cryptographic verification. Here we propose elements of a solution, ranging from light-touch to robust, and how they could be implemented in a practical way. Any solution should aim to preserve the benefits of the scheme (global uniqueness, decentralization) while adding guarantees of authenticity and ownership. Key components could include:
Cryptographic binding of name to ownership proof:
In a stronger scheme, simply claiming an identifier would not be enough; the developer would supply a cryptographic proof that they are authorized to use that domain name. For example, this could be done by obtaining a certificate or a signed token from the domain owner. One model is to have a certificate authority issue a special code-signing certificate that includes the domain name (similar to how Extended Validation (EV) SSL certificates include an organization’s identity). The developer would then sign their app or package with this certificate. The OS or package manager could verify that the app’s claimed identifier (e.g. com.somebrand.app) matches the domain in the certificate (somebrand.com). This is analogous to how websites use SSL certificates to prove they control a domain. Another mechanism: the developer could publish a DNS TXT record on their domain containing a public key or an authorization code for their app ID, and include the corresponding private key signature in the app. The important part is tying the app’s identity to a token that only the real domain owner can produce. This could be done using existing PKI infrastructure for instance, a service like Let’s Encrypt (which automates domain validation for TLS) could issue short-lived “App Identity Certificates” upon proving control of DNS. The app store or build tool would then embed that certificate or a hash of it in the app package. On installation, the platform verifies that com.somebrand.* is covered by a valid certificate from a trusted authority. This approach ensures that even if an attacker picks someone else’s domain name, they cannot obtain the corresponding certificate (since they can’t prove domain control). It would cryptographically bind the reverse-DNS string to the legitimate owner of that DNS name, creating a strong integrity check.
Domain verification flows (with rotation and expiry):
Implementing the above requires a user-friendly verification flow. Likely this means integrating with DNS or web hosting as proof points. For example, when registering an app/package name, the developer could be prompted to verify the domain: “To use the prefix somebrand.com in your identifier, please prove you own somebrand.com by either uploading a file at https://somebrand.com/.well-known/app-verification or adding the following TXT record to your DNS.” This is similar to how Google, Apple, and other services let you verify domain ownership for various purposes. Once verified, a token is issued (which might be used to get a certificate as above). Key rotation and expiry need to be handled: domains can be lost or sold, so these proofs should expire periodically (say, annually) and require re-verification. If a domain’s ownership changes, the new owner should eventually be able to claim the name space. The system might enforce that the app’s certificate or verification token is only valid for a certain time, after which the app must be re-signed or re-verified. This raises implementation details: for mobile apps, you don’t want them to just stop working when a cert expires. A possible strategy is similar to code signing certificates the OS could accept an app if at install time the certificate was valid and perhaps use timestamping to allow longevity. Alternatively, app updates could be required to refresh the verification. Revocation and change: If a domain is transferred, the new owner could go through the verification flow. If they succeed, ideally the previous owner’s token is revoked (maybe via a transparency log or authority that notes the change). There might need to be a grace period or conflict resolution policy (see dispute resolution below). The important design principle is to allow updates (like domains changing hands, or a company deciding to rename their apps under a different domain) with a planned process, rather than locking names forever or never rechecking them. This is tricky but solvable with governance perhaps requiring that if domain ownership changes, the original app developer gets a notification and a period to update their app’s identifier if needed, or else their verification status lapses.
Public registries or transparency logs:
To bolster trust and enable community oversight, a system of registries or transparency logs could be introduced. A registry could be something like “AppIDs.gov” (just a hypothetical) where developers optionally or mandatorily register their app’s identifier and link it to evidence of domain ownership. But a centralized registry might be heavy. A more modern approach is transparency logs, inspired by Certificate Transparency in the web PKI. Certificate Transparency logs record all certificates issued so domain owners can monitor misuse. Similarly, one could create an App Identity Transparency Log that records claims of association between domain names and app identifiers or signing keys. For instance, whenever a certificate for com.somebrand.* is issued (as per the cryptographic binding step), that certificate is posted to a public append-only log. Domain owners could monitor this log (perhaps with automated queries) to see if any certificates or app claims have been made for their domain. If, say, example.com sees a record that someone obtained a certificate for com.example.evilapp, they can raise an alarm (just like a domain owner today can be alerted if a rogue SSL cert is issued for their domain). Transparency logs would make any attempted impersonation visible to the community and auditors, even if a CA or store was tricked into issuing a certificate. Additionally, logs can help resolve disputes by providing an evidence trail of who claimed what and when. The log could be operated by a consortium (e.g., run by major platform providers or a neutral non-profit), ensuring no single party can secretly authorize a malicious mapping. This approach leverages openness as a security measure similar to how open certificate logs have helped detect mis-issued web certificates.
Migration strategy for legacy apps:
Any new system must account for the huge number of existing apps and packages that do not have verified identifiers. A realistic strategy is gradual, opt-in adoption with incentives rather than an overnight mandate. For example, app stores or package repositories could introduce the concept of “verified publisher/ID” badges. Initially, it could be optional: developers prove their domain and get a badge or higher trust ranking. Over time, this could become expected for certain high-risk categories (like banking apps must verify their domain, etc.). For open-source libraries, Maven Central or npm could allow an optional field for domain verification, and perhaps consumers (build tools) could warn if a package claims a known company’s domain but isn’t verified. Legacy apps that never verify would continue to function, but users and enterprises might increasingly treat them as suspect or at least not “trusted” to the same degree. Another approach is to grandfather in existing names with a period of leniency e.g., any new apps after 202X must verify, but older ones are exempt unless a conflict arises. The migration needs to be carefully communicated and tooled: provide easy ways for developers to verify or to renounce a domain prefix if they can’t verify. Perhaps alternative unique IDs (like UUIDs or publisher IDs) could be used for those who truly can’t verify any domain; those would be obviously un-linked to any brand, reducing the risk of impersonation (because a random GUID has no implied trust). Essentially, make the legitimate apps more clearly legitimate, and the unverifiable ones clearly marked as such, so over time impersonators stand out.
Dispute resolution and transfer policy:
No matter how well-designed, conflicts will occur. For example, a developer has used com.example.app for years but never actually owned example.com, and now the owner of example.com wants to publish an app. Who gets to use com.example prefix going forward? Or consider a domain that was verified to an app, but the domain has since been sold the original app still exists; what should happen? These scenarios require a policy framework outside of pure technology. One approach is to borrow from the domain name world’s UDRP (Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy) for trademarks, but scoped to app IDs. Perhaps app stores would host an arbitration process: if a domain owner objects to someone else using their domain in an identifier, they can file a claim. The arbitrators could consider factors like who used it first, is there malicious intent or consumer confusion, etc. Ideally, the domain owner would have strong priority if an app is clearly trying to impersonate or if the app developer can’t prove any legitimate tie. But there may be gray areas e.g., open-source library uses com.spring.framework for 10 years (without owning spring.com), and now some company Spring Corp buys spring.com and wants that namespace. Policies would need to balance continuity (not breaking existing software) with fairness (letting domain owners assert control to prevent misuse). A technical facilitation might be to allow namespace transfers: an app’s verified identity could be updated if both parties (old and new domain owner) agree or if an arbitrator approves. The transparency log could record these transfers to maintain an audit trail. For handling expiration: if a domain expires and is scooped up by an unrelated party, the new owner should not instantly be able to hijack the old app’s identity (especially if the old app is still being used). A grace period or continued acceptance of the old verification for some time could be in place, during which the new owner might be prevented from verifying that domain for a conflicting new app. These details are complex, but the core is to have a governance process in parallel with the technical system, to handle exceptional cases. This is something that could be managed by platform operators (Google/Apple for mobile, maintainers for package repos) potentially in a coordinated way or via industry guidelines.
Minimal viable approach vs stronger approach:
It’s worth distinguishing a minimal approach that addresses the worst abuses, and a fully robust approach. A minimal viable standard might involve simply validating domain ownership at the time of app registration (out-of-band, not cryptographically at runtime). For instance, Google Play Console could prompt: “You want to use somebrand in your package name please verify you own somebrand.com (or have permission).” If you fail, they might not reject the app but could flag it for extra review or restrict its visibility. This would deter casual impersonators. Apple could do similarly during App Store submission. This approach is lighter weight but less enforceable outside official channels. A stronger approach is the cryptographic binding and enforcement at the OS level meaning an OS could actually warn the user on install: “This app’s identifier suggests it’s from SomeBrand, but that is not verified” or conversely “Verified: this app is published by SomeBrand.com”. That requires deeper integration and the certificate infrastructure described. We might see a progression: first the minimal (policies in stores, optional verification badges) then moving towards mandatory verification for certain namespaces or platforms as the ecosystem adapts.
It’s important to note any regulation of naming would need broad adoption to be truly effective. If only one app store or one language ecosystem does it, attackers can simply move to another context. Ideally, an alliance of major players (OS vendors, language package repository maintainers, etc.) would come together to define a common approach (maybe via an open standard for software identity verification). This could even tie into emerging efforts like software bill of materials (SBOMs) and supply-chain security frameworks, which aim to verify where software comes from. A verified identifier could be one piece of metadata in an SBOM, for instance.
To put it concretely, one could envision in a few years: Google Play, Apple App Store, and major package registries adopting a policy that any new package or app using a domain-like identifier must complete a domain verification step. They might offer free automated services to do so (similar to how Let’s Encrypt made HTTPS free and easy). Developers who can’t or won’t can still publish, but under a neutral namespace or marked as unverified. Security-conscious users or organizations could then configure devices to only trust apps/packages that have verified identities (just as some orgs only trust signed software). This would dramatically raise the bar for attackers they could no longer casually impersonate a domain unless they actually compromised that domain or CA, which is a much higher hurdle.
Challenges: Of course, there are challenges: coordinating authorities, handling offline scenarios (some development is offline though verification could be done once when publishing), ensuring the system itself isn’t gamed (CAs must be careful to validate domains properly to issue app certificates). Performance-wise, verifying a chain of certificates or checking a transparency log entry is feasible (a one-time cost during installation or first use). Another challenge is developer education and adoption making the process as smooth as possible so that legitimate devs don’t revolt. The success of Let’s Encrypt in the web world is a hopeful analog: they turned a cumbersome process (obtaining SSL certs) into an automated, quick API, resulting in massive adoption and better security. A similar effort could be directed here, possibly leveraging existing ACME protocol for certificate issuance, etc., extended for code signing.
In summary, a regulated/regularized reverse-DNS scheme would involve verifying the link between the domain and the software, using cryptographic proofs and logs to enforce it, providing migration paths for old software, and establishing rules for conflicts. It ranges from lightweight verification badges to deep OS-level enforcement, and the final solution might include elements of both. The next section provides recommendations on how different stakeholders can move towards this vision in a realistic manner, minimizing ecosystem breakage while significantly improving trust in software identities.
Recommendations and Path Forward
Bridging the gap between convention and verification will require collective effort. Here we outline recommendations for key stakeholders platform vendors, domain registrars, app stores, and enterprise users to incrementally improve the state of software identity:
1. Platform Vendors (OS and language ecosystem maintainers):
Vendors like Google (Android) and Apple (iOS/macOS) should lead by integrating domain verification into their developer platforms. For mobile apps, this could mean updating developer guidelines and tools to encourage or require domain ownership validation when choosing an app/package ID. Google has already taken steps like developer identity verification; they could extend Play Console to include a one-click “Verify your domain” process, leveraging DNS or file upload methods. Apple could do similarly in App Store Connect. Initially, this can be optional with incentives: e.g., apps that verify their domain might get a "verified" badge in the store or be prioritized in search rankings (signaling trust to users). In the long run, vendors can make it a requirement for certain categories (such as financial apps, official government apps, etc.). Platform vendors should also implement the technical underpinnings: support new code signing attributes or certificates that include domain info, and modify installation workflows to check for verification data. They can collaborate on a unified standard (so that, say, an “App Identity Certificate” might be recognized on both Android and iOS). By moving in tandem, they reduce the chance of attackers simply shifting targets between platforms. For programming language ecosystems (Java, Python, etc.), maintainers of tools like Maven, PyPI, npm could incorporate domain verification as an optional metadata field. For example, Maven Central could allow library publishers to add a certificate or DNS-verified flag that the groupId’s domain is under their control; build tools could then warn if an artifact claiming a known company domain is unverified. While retrofitting languages is harder, even a light-touch approach (like a publicly queryable registry of verified package namespaces) could help. Overall, platform maintainers are in the best position to implement systemic changes and should convene working groups to design these changes (possibly under standards bodies like the IETF or IEEE if cross-industry coordination is needed).
2. Domain Registrars and Certificate Authorities:
The DNS and certificate ecosystem can play a supportive role. Registrars could offer value-added services for software developers e.g., when you buy a domain, also get a code signing identity tied to that domain. Certificate Authorities (CAs) might create a class of certificates specifically for code/app identity, which include the domain name and perhaps an app name, issued under a process similar to obtaining SSL certificates (domain validation). They could integrate with platforms so that obtaining such a certificate is streamlined. For instance, a developer could request an “App Domain Certificate” for example.com via an ACME-like protocol, which the CA issues after DNS verification, and then the developer uses it to sign their app. Registrars could partner with CAs (many registrars already help customers get SSL certs; they could do the same for app certs). Additionally, registrars could help disseminate information about these practices to domain owners: if you own a domain, be aware that you can assert rights over software using your name. They might even monitor transparency logs (once established) and alert their customers if an app or package is claiming their domain without verification. Since registrars manage the domain lifecycle (including transfers and expirations), they could also assist in coordinating transitions e.g., when a domain is sold, sending notifications about any known app certificates that exist for that domain so that the new owner can evaluate them. While these are beyond traditional registrar duties, it aligns with increasing emphasis on security in the domain industry (e.g., efforts around DNSSEC, certificate issuance checks, etc.). In short, registrars and CAs should be part of the trust chain for software identity, just as they are for website identity.
3. App Stores and Package Repositories:
Stores like Google Play, Apple App Store, and repositories like Maven Central, npm, PyPI have direct influence on the software that reaches users. They should implement policies and features to detect and prevent abusive naming. Concretely, stores can augment their review processes with automated checks: if an app’s bundle ID includes a famous trademark or domain that doesn’t match the developer’s verified identity, flag it for manual review or require a proof. This is a low-hanging fruit to catch impersonators (some of which they already do informally, but it can be more systematic). Repositories can similarly flag packages that use namespaces resembling well-known projects but are published by others the “dependency confusion” audits are an example of becoming aware of such conflicts. Repositories could, for example, reserve certain top-level group or scope names (like com.microsoft or org.apache) to only be used by those organizations, or at least hold them pending verification. App stores specifically should improve user-facing transparency: show the user (especially in enterprise contexts) if an app’s claimed domain identity is verified or not. This could be as simple as an icon or statement in the app details: “Domain ownership verified: Yes/No”. If unverified, it doesn’t block installation but serves as a warning sign. Enterprise app catalog tools might choose to block or flag unverified apps by policy if such metadata is available, giving organizations more control.
Moreover, app stores can act as authorities for dispute resolution. They can establish clear procedures where, if a domain owner contacts them about a particular app name, they have a process to handle it (change the app ID, merge accounts, etc., depending on cases). Right now it’s ad hoc formalizing it would prepare them for increased verification enforcement. Stores and repos also have a carrot to offer: highlighting verified apps/libraries as more trustworthy. This not only guides users toward safer choices but also pressures developers (nobody wants their app labeled “unverified/untrusted” when a competitor’s has a green checkmark of verification). Such social pressure can drive adoption of the new scheme.
4. Enterprises and End-User Organizations:
Companies that manage devices or consume software at scale (enterprise IT, government agencies, etc.) should update their security policies to account for this issue. Many enterprises maintain allow-lists of mobile apps by bundle ID or enforce MDM rules by app identifiers. They should be aware that those IDs are not strongly bound to the supposed owner. Thus, whenever possible, they should require additional validation. For example, an enterprise MDM could leverage new OS capabilities: if iOS/Android provide a flag that an app’s domain is verified, an MDM compliance rule could mandate that all internally used apps have verified identifiers (or explicitly exception-listed if not). Enterprises can also push vendors: ask your software suppliers to verify their domain identity as part of procurement. For instance, if a company is buying a B2B app from a third party, they might ask that third party to use a bundle ID under their official domain and verify it through the app store. On the development side, enterprises producing their own apps should follow best practices use domains you own in your IDs and consider verifying them proactively. This both protects your brand and sets an example.
For internal software composition, teams should treat an unverified reverse-DNS package name with skepticism. Just because a library is org.example.something doesn’t prove it’s from Example Corp check the source or use emerging tools that validate package provenance (such as Sigstore for container images and build artifacts, which can include domain contexts). In short, defenders (enterprises) should not rely solely on the name; they should incorporate verification signals into their trust decisions. By voicing demand for such signals (e.g., asking Apple/Google for verification features, or requiring them in RFPs for software), enterprises can increase the pressure on platform providers to implement these features.
5. Incremental Steps (Realistically Without Breaking Ecosystems):
It’s worth emphasizing that the transition has to be incremental. As recommendations: start with opt-in verification and education. Platform vendors and stores should roll out the infrastructure and encourage its use without immediately blocking unverified apps. Monitor adoption and gradually tighten requirements in high-risk areas. Simultaneously, build the transparency log or public registry and encourage researchers and community to monitor it this could catch misissuance early and also build trust in the system (similar to how Certificate Transparency made CAs more accountable). Over time, possibly enforce that new identifiers (say, starting 2025 or 2026) must be verified if they match an Internet domain format. The old ones could be grandfathered but if any update tries to change critical aspects, ask them to verify then.
One realistic measure short of full cryptographic enforcement: have OSes warn on side-loaded apps if the bundle ID domain is suspicious. For example, Android could pop up “This app’s identifier suggests it’s from XYZ.com, but that is not verified. Do you still want to install?” in cases of sideloading or unknown sources. This doesn’t break anything but introduces friction for potentially malicious cases, and most users would think twice.
Another partial measure is community reporting: if transparency logs exist, empower security researchers to flag anomalies (e.g., multiple different developers using the same domain in app IDs across platforms which could indicate something fishy like an impostor). Stores can then investigate those.
6. Collaboration on Standards:
All stakeholders should consider forming a working group or leveraging an existing one (like the OpenID Foundation or some software alliance) to standardize “Software Identifier Verification Protocols.” This ensures solutions are not proprietary one-offs. For example, a standard for an App Identity Certificate could be drafted, including what fields (domain, developer name, usage) it contains, recognized by multiple OSes. Another standard might define a common API for domain verification that any app store or CI/CD pipeline can use. The benefit of standards is to avoid fragmentation we don’t want Google’s verification to be totally different from Apple’s such that a developer has to do two completely separate processes. If, say, a developer proves to Google they own example.com, maybe that proof could be reused to get a certificate that Apple would also trust. It requires trust federations (maybe cross-signing by neutral CAs), but it’s feasible. This lowers the burden on developers and increases overall coverage.
7. Long-term Vision Verified Software Identity as Norm:
In a future state, we would treat unverified reverse-DNS names similarly to how browsers now treat self-signed or invalid SSL certificates: allowed but with big warnings. The aim is that the community moves from implicit trust in names to explicit trust in verified claims. Platform vendors should also integrate this with supply chain security initiatives (like Google’s Android Play Integrity API could incorporate verifying that the app package name is under the publisher’s domain control, enhancing device attestation; Apple’s notarization for Mac apps could include domain verification steps, etc.).
By taking these steps, we do not “break” existing ecosystems outright apps continue to run, packages continue to be downloadable but we overlay a layer of verified identity that gradually supersedes the old purely conventional system. Attackers will find it much harder to abuse names when users and systems increasingly look for that verified flag or certificate. Defenders will be empowered with concrete signals (they no longer have to guess if com.evilcorp.app is really EvilCorp’s they can check the proof). Legitimate developers and companies benefit too: their apps and libraries gain an extra badge of trust, and it becomes harder for impostors to tarnish their name.
In conclusion, while reverse domain naming served well as a decentralized uniqueness mechanism, the evolving threat landscape calls for adding accountability to it. Through cooperative efforts and careful design, we can retain the openness and global scope of this naming scheme, but back it with authenticity guarantees. The recommendations above chart a path where in the future, seeing com.mybank.app on a device can give not just a hint of origin but a cryptographically assured proof that it indeed comes from MyBank turning a de facto convention into a trustworthy identity system.
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